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Introduction   
Beginning well before the attacks of 9/11, scholars and policy experts have studied the 
challenges that terrorism presents for intelligence agencies and officials.  This essay reviews the 
literature on intelligence and terrorism, discusses the primary arguments and issues covered in 
that literature, and develops a typology of three schools of thought into which much of this work 
can be organized.  It argues that even though the scholarly and policy literature on intelligence 
and terrorism has grown significantly since the attacks of September 11, 2001, there are still a 
number of areas that are understudied and deserve further research.   
 More than six years after 9/11, the academic and scholarly literature has produced 
surprisingly little in-depth, empirical work on the use of intelligence in counterterrorism.  For 
example, Amy Zegart’s Spying Blind (Zegart 2007a) is one of the first book-length academic 
studies of that intelligence failure to be produced.1  This gap in the literature may simply reflect 
the nature of the information involved; Magnus Ranstorp comments, “Few academic studies 
successfully connect the terrorism and intelligence studies fields as it demands mastery of two 
relatively inaccessible information and analytical domains” (2007:16).  The time lag may also 
not be very unusual in an historical context; after all, Roberta Wohlstetter’s seminal work, Pearl 
                                                 
1 Other recent books such as Posner (2005), Russell (2007), and Betts (2007) examine the use of intelligence in the 
case of 9/11, but as part of broader reviews of American intelligence.   
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Harbor: Warning and Decision, was not published until 1962, well after the event it studied.  
But the current lag does suggest that the 9/11 attacks themselves remain understudied from a 
scholarly perspective, and that as Ranstorp (2007) again notes, scholars have yet to make 
extensive use of the 9/11 Commission Report as a reference.     
 Several authors have produced valuable article- and chapter-length overviews of 
intelligence and terrorism (for example Sims 2007a; Campbell & Flournoy 2001; Ball 2002), and 
useful research has been done concerning specific issues such as the importance of human 
intelligence or the need for improved international intelligence coordination.  But much of the 
work in this area remains general in nature, with many articles consisting of primarily a reminder 
that terrorism is an especially difficult problem, combined with a recommendation that 
intelligence agencies place greater emphasis on certain problems or make greater use of 
particular analytical or collection techniques.   
 This review focuses on what has been written about the challenges international terrorism 
presents for intelligence organizations in the U.S. and elsewhere, and about how those 
organizations can best respond to that challenge.  Some important but broader topics--such as 
intelligence reform, intelligence oversight, and the debate over how to balance liberty and 
security in domestic intelligence--are discussed elsewhere in the Compendium, so are not 
covered in detail here.  
 This article is organized into five sections.  The first section reviews the literature on 
intelligence and terrorism produced before the 9/11 attacks.  The second section looks at how the 
literature changed after 9/11, and highlights several areas on which there has been general 
(although by no means unanimous) consensus.  Section three reviews how scholars and policy 
experts have answered what some consider to be the most important questions in this literature: 
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why have intelligence agencies failed to prevent 9/11 and other major terrorist attacks, and what 
must be done to improve their ability to prevent future attacks?  Here there is no consensus, and 
this section argues that the literature can be organized into three schools of thought, each of 
which offers a quite different explanation of past failures and prescription for the future.  These 
three schools can be called the traditional school, the intelligence reformist school, and the CIA 
critics’ school.  The final section describes additional questions discussed in the literature, and 
outlines several areas where further research is needed.   
 
Literature on Intelligence and Terrorism before 9/11  
 
A reader of many pre-9/11 works on intelligence and terrorism is struck by how familiar the 
issues and arguments appear today.  Several early articles noted that the effort to gather 
intelligence on terrorist groups presents particular difficulties for democracies.  Their authors 
discussed the need for oversight of intelligence activities, and the difficult question of where the 
balance should be struck between protecting civil liberties and ensuring public safety (Cooper 
1978; Robertson 1987; Taylor 1987).  Other familiar topics discussed included the need for 
international coordination in counterterrorism intelligence efforts (Kerstetter 1979), and the 
differing roles played by the FBI and the CIA in combating terrorism (Prince 1989).   
 In this earlier literature, scholars examined major terrorist attacks such as the 1983 
Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon (Ofri 1984), and the bombing of the U.S. Embassy 
Annex in Beirut in 1984 (Motley 1986; 1987).  Their conclusions often sound as if they could 
have been written much more recently: that although good intelligence is a key factor in 
countering terrorism it is very difficult to obtain, and that policy makers should not expect to 
receive perfect intelligence on terrorist threats.  David A. Charters (1991) urged that policy 
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makers and the public should be educated on both the possibilities, but also the limits, of 
intelligence against terrorism.     
 A number of authors saw human intelligence (HUMINT) as the most important factor in 
countering terrorism.  James Berry Motley wrote (1987:169) that “It is human intelligence—
clandestine agents, informers—that is the key to coping with terrorism” (see also Sulc 1987; Ofri 
1984).  But the American intelligence community, in particular, was seen as weak in its ability to 
gain HUMINT on terrorist groups.  Motley, for example, noted in a separate article (1986:83) 
that “the U.S. intelligence community to date has been severely limited in its ability to penetrate 
international terrorist organizations.”     
 In an important early article, Shlomo Gazit and Michael Handel (1980) argued that in the 
intelligence effort against terrorism, overt collection was the least valuable source; aerial 
photography was not very important; technical intelligence, including signals intelligence, was of 
greater importance; but the most important source was HUMINT, including information gained 
through the interrogation of captured terrorists.  They described the concept of “intelligence 
warfare” against terrorists, in which intelligence works closely with operators, and methods such 
as deception, psychological warfare, and covert operations are used alongside the more 
commonly discussed intelligence methods of collection and analysis.  In a comment that rings as 
true today as it did then, they stated that “in counterterrorist warfare more than any other type of 
war, the intelligence organization itself is in the forefront of military operations; frequently the 
border between intelligence work and combat activity is blurred” (Gazit & Handel 1980:131).     
 The primary message of this pre-9/11 literature was, in the words of terrorism expert 
Bruce Hoffman, that “the importance of intelligence to anticipate, pre-empt, and respond is 
paramount” (Hoffman 1996:219).  A few authors in the years before 9/11 were relatively 
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optimistic about the ability of intelligence agencies and analysts to track and counter terrorist 
groups.  Ian Lesser, for example, argued (1999) that the increasing reliance by terrorists on 
modern information technology would introduce new possibilities for monitoring and 
surveillance.  But for the most part, scholars were pessimistic about the future, warning about the 
growing challenge for intelligence from threats such as nuclear terrorism (Beres 1997; Badey 
2001), and terrorists using weapons of mass destruction more broadly (Marlo 1999).   
  
After 9/11: Areas of Consensus    
The attacks of September 11, 2001, reconfirmed for many scholars both the importance and the 
difficulty of obtaining useful intelligence on terrorist groups.  Academics, policy experts, and 
intelligence professionals have produced numerous articles and papers examining the current 
challenges presented for intelligence by terrorism, and on a number of issues there is broad 
agreement in the literature.  This section reviews these areas of consensus, and points out where, 
even here, important disagreements remain.     
  
Increased Importance of Intelligence   
 
Intelligence is generally understood to have increased in importance and prestige since the 9/11 
attacks.  David Kahn writes that the war on terrorism “has featured intelligence in a starring 
role,” while according to Michael Herman, “Intelligence has been riding high since 11 
September” (Kahn 2006:134; Herman 2002:227).  Policy makers as well as scholars have made 
the point that the current war on terrorism is unusual in that intelligence occupies such a critical 
part.  Michael Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has described 
intelligence as being more deeply involved in this war than it has been in any other (Hayden 
2007), and the United States National Security Strategy published soon after 9/11 stated that 
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“Intelligence—and how we use it—is our first line of defense against terrorists and the threat 
posed by hostile states” (National Security Strategy 2002:30).  British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
made the same argument in 2003, calling intelligence “Britain’s first line of defence against 
terrorism” (Herman 2004:348).       
 But while the war on terrorism has led to larger budgets for intelligence services and a 
more prominent role for intelligence in national decision making, this greater attention has 
brought with it greater expectations, which scholars argue the intelligence communities of the 
United States and other nations are finding it difficult to meet.  According to Kahn, “intelligence 
gathering and analysis are now considered such indispensable government functions -- and so 
much is expected of them -- that their inability to disperse the fog of war or of international 
politics causes outrage” (Kahn 2006:134).     
 Additional challenges for intelligence agencies have been created because at the same 
time that public attention is being focused on intelligence, the struggle against international 
terrorism has placed more emphasis on the aspects of the intelligence business that are the most 
secret, such as covert operations and espionage (Herman 2004; Kibbe 2007).  The lines 
separating military operations, law enforcement, and intelligence operations are becoming more 
blurred, creating new operational, legal, and organizational difficulties (Jenkins 2006a; Best 
2003).  Charles Cogan writes that intelligence operatives of the 21st century will have to be more 
like hunters than gatherers: “They will not simply sit back and gather information that comes in, 
analyze it and then decide what to do about it.  Rather they will have to go and hunt out 
intelligence that will enable them to track down or kill terrorists.”  This job, he predicts, will be 
largely one for the military Special Forces community, with intelligence services such as the CIA 
relegated to a supporting role (Cogan 2004:317).       
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Terrorism is a More Difficult Problem   
Although terrorism is not the only important mission for intelligence services in the 21st century, 
it is widely considered to be the top priority for Western intelligence services.  And most 
scholars and experts believe it is an especially difficult problem for intelligence to deal with.  
James Hansen puts it starkly: “The al-Qaeda network is believed by some to be the most difficult 
intelligence adversary the U.S. has ever faced” (Hansen 2004:692).  The intelligence systems and 
techniques developed during the Cold War are seen as inappropriate for countering terrorists.  
Fritz Ermarth notes (2002) that “Gathering intelligence on terrorists is a far more difficult task 
than assessing whether a strategic rival is planning a massive military attack on the United 
States. By nature, the terrorist works by stealth, avoiding targets for which elaborate military-
style preparations are necessary.”     
 American intelligence officials have argued that the nature of the intelligence problem is 
dramatically different and more difficult today.  Director of National Intelligence Michael 
McConnell notes that in dealing with a conventional military threat, there is relatively little 
problem determining the enemy’s capability--his order of battle.  With a conventional foe, the 
enemy’s intent is the question.  But in the case of terrorism, McConnell argues, “it’s just the 
opposite.”  Here the intent to commit harm is clear, and the challenge for intelligence is to learn 
the enemy’s capability to do so (McConnell 2007a).  CIA Director Michael Hayden points out 
(2007) another difference between the problems faced by the intelligence community in the Cold 
War and today.  During the Cold War the enemy’s forces, such as troop formations, tanks, and 
ballistic missile silos, were relatively easy to find, but hard to kill.  Today, on the other hand, 
“the situation is reversed.  We are now in an age in which our primary adversary is easy to kill, 
but hard to find.”    
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 Gregory Treverton argues (2007) that terrorism is a more challenging problem for 
intelligence because it presents a mystery, to which there is no easy answer, rather than a puzzle, 
which can at least in theory be solved.  During the Cold War, U.S. intelligence was charged with 
finding answers to puzzles such as determining how many missiles were in the Soviet inventory.  
But today intelligence agencies are finding it much more difficult to solve mysteries such as, 
what is the nature of the threat from al Qaeda?  (See also Kauppi 2002.)  Because traditional 
intelligence threat assessments are more difficult to produce, many intelligence and security 
officials have begun to use vulnerability-based assessments that start by identifying one’s own 
vulnerabilities and then develop scenarios the enemy might follow.  Jenkins (2006b; 2006c) 
points out that such scenarios can take on a life of their own, appearing to produce inevitable and 
unstoppable threats that may not really exist.     
 Several writers have commented that international terrorist groups such as al Qaeda are 
an especially difficult problem, even more challenging for intelligence than other types of 
terrorist organizations.  James W. Harris, for example, argues (2002) that al Qaeda’s worldwide 
goals set it apart not only from state-sponsored terrorist groups, but also from other grassroots 
terrorist groups such as Hamas.   
 
Importance of Domestic and Local-Level Intelligence 
 
 Although most studies of intelligence and terrorism focus on the national or international 
level, a number of authors have pointed out that much of the critical intelligence work is done at 
the internal, domestic level, by local police and state and regional law enforcement authorities 
(Peterson 2005, Riley 2005).  Stella Rimington, the former head of Britain’s domestic 
intelligence organization MI5, writes (2005) that terrorism intelligence is not developed by spies 
 8
overseas as often as one might expect: “My own experience is that effective counter-terrorism 
frequently begins closer to home and may appear a lot more mundane.”    
 Local police departments may be the first to detect indications of an active terrorist cell, 
and hospitals might be the first to notice the results of a biological attack.  For that reason 
communications systems and common procedures need to be established that link law 
enforcement agencies with each other, with potential first responders, and with intelligence 
services.  (See Jenkins 2006a and 2006b; Sims 2007a, Hulnick 2005.)    
 Increased domestic intelligence collection presents the opportunity for abuses and 
violations of civil liberties, and commentators such as Marrin (2003) note that homeland security 
intelligence will require new and greater forms of oversight.  In addition, coordination between 
intelligence and law enforcement is not easy, in large part because the cultures of the two 
communities are very different (Treverton 2003).  But in the U.S. at any rate, significant steps 
are being made, including a proliferation of Joint Terrorism Task Forces and state and local 
intelligence fusion centers (Sullivan & Wirtz 2008).      
 The new requirements of countering terrorism at home are driving new methods and 
models of collection and analysis.  Bruce Berkowitz argues that intelligence for homeland 
security requires a type of tradecraft very different from the old CIA model in which the 
government secretly collected highly sensitive information from hostile countries and unsavory 
characters.   “The business model for a homeland intelligence agency (if we had one) would 
sound something like: ‘Collect as much information from as many sources as possible, respect 
the civil liberties of Americans, and get the product to hundreds of thousands of local officials, 
public safety officers, and first responders so they can anticipate threats and respond 
effectively’” (Berkowitz 2004:3-4).      
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 According to some scholars and analysts, new categories of intelligence may need to be 
devised, joining the panoply of intelligence disciplines such as signals and human intelligence 
and the standard hierarchy of strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence (Herman 2003, 
Berkowitz 2002a).  Michael Studeman (2007) argues that the term “domestic intelligence” is not 
sufficient to describe the new types of intelligence required—and especially the sorts of 
intelligence used by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security—because it implies a strictly 
inward focus.  Instead, the concept of Homeland Security Intelligence, he believes, better 
describes the broad range of intelligence information and activities needed to protect against 
threats to America.  Although the abbreviation “HSINT” cannot yet be said to have caught on 
very widely, it has begun to be used to describe this new type of intelligence (Masse 2006).         
 
International Intelligence Cooperation   
 
A number of authors have noted that because terrorism today is an increasingly international 
threat, counterterrorism efforts must be international as well.  As Stephen Lander puts it 
(2004:482), “a threat that operates virtually irrespective of nationality and national borders poses 
particular challenges for intelligence services and for international collaboration between states.”  
 The importance of intelligence liaison relationships for counterterrorism was recognized 
well before 9/11 (for example Motley 1986), but such arrangements are becoming increasingly 
important today in what Michael Herman calls the “internationalization” of intelligence (2004: 
349-350).  Useful discussions of the issue include Rudner (2004), Sims (2006), Svendsen (2008), 
Lefebvre (2003), Segell (2004), Lansford (2007), and Stevenson (2006).  Nomikos (2005) and 
Norell (2007) focus on European intelligence cooperation.  Not everyone believes, however, that 
intelligence efforts have yet become sufficiently “international.”  Mackmurdo (2007), for 
example, argues that international intelligence relationships, and trust among intelligence 
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services, are lacking today.  He suggests that the United Nations in particular needs to develop an 
effective intelligence capability to combat international terrorism.    
 Concerning the United States, Richard J. Aldrich notes that even the world’s largest 
intelligence system can’t go it alone in the effort against international terrorism, as “despite its 
size, the United States finds itself dependent to some degree on intelligence alliances with 
middle power allies.  It produces more intelligence but also has a vast appetite.  It is a massive 
exporter of technical intelligence while it is also surprisingly dependent on friends for certain 
kinds of espionage” (Aldrich 2002:54).  Derek S. Reveron (2006) points out that in the U.S. 
since 9/11, most of the discussion about intelligence sharing has focused inward--on improving 
information sharing within the U.S. intelligence community.  He argues that greater attention 
should be paid to the need for U.S. intelligence agencies to establish cooperative international 
relationships, especially bilateral agreements that might take advantage of another country’s 
comparative intelligence advantage in a particular geographic region or against a certain target.     
 
Human Intelligence is Increasingly Important   
 
 Many experts believe that the most important source of intelligence on terrorist groups is 
human intelligence (HUMINT).  Human intelligence is not seen as the complete answer to the 
problem of terrorism, of course, and some authors argue that other sources can be very useful, 
such as signals intelligence (Aid 2003 and 2006), or open source intelligence (Lewis & 
Chenoweth 2007; Sloan 2006).  It is also frequently pointed out that other types of intelligence 
community improvements are needed, such as increasing the numbers of interpreters and officers 
with critical language skills, developing databases to handle the new information, and 
experimenting with new (and often not-so-new) analytic methods such as red-teaming.  (See for 
example Campbell & Flournoy 2001.)  But the most commonly heard argument is that technical 
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intelligence collection methods such as IMINT and SIGINT are not very useful against terrorist 
targets, while HUMINT is critical.   
 Brian Jenkins (2003) expresses this view in his testimony before the 9/11 Commission:  
“Using intelligence to prevent terrorist attacks is very difficult. There are no troop mobilizations 
to watch for, no ships, no aircraft to track. Knowing what terrorists might do depends largely on 
human sources—undercover agents and informants. Penetrating small terrorist groups may take 
months, years.”  As Jenkins indicates, human intelligence is seen as something of a dilemma for 
intelligence agencies, as on the one hand it is critical in the fight against terrorism, but on the 
other hand it is extremely difficult to obtain.  (See also Lewis 2004, Betts 2007, Weiner 2007.)      
 Some are skeptical about the belief that increased HUMINT is the answer.  Mark V. 
Kauppi (2006:424) notes that placing American agents within terrorist groups is very difficult, 
even if the agent is a native-born speaker of the local language, because many terrorist groups 
are clan- or tribal-based.  Michael Herman argues that “even the best Humint—and the extensive 
liaison with foreign services it often entails—will not provide a magical solution on targets of the 
Al-Qaeda kind” (Herman 2003:44).  Frederick P. Hitz writes (2005:731)  that recruiting agents 
(spies) is harder today than it used to be.  “In the war on terrorism, the spies will surely be harder 
to get at than during the Cold War.  Their religious, ethnic, and cultural differences from 
Western spy-runners, and the tight bond of their terrorist commitment, will assure this fact.”  
 Several former CIA operations officers have also written about the difficulty terrorism 
poses for American human intelligence operatives.  In a comment written before 9/11 but often 
cited since those attacks as an illustration of how the CIA has been too risk-averse and 
bureaucratic, Reuel Marc Gerecht (2001) quotes a CIA case officer as saying: “Operations that 
include diarrhea as a way of life don’t happen.”   
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 One way for intelligence services to address this difficulty may be to expand their use of 
non-traditional types of human intelligence collection.  Richard Russell argues that the CIA 
“needs to break its umbilical cord to U.S. diplomatic facilities overseas as its primarily 
infrastructure for human intelligence collection.”  Instead of relying almost completely on case 
officers based under diplomatic cover at embassies, he believes, U.S. intelligence must 
substantially increase its use of officers under non-official cover—known as NOCs (Russell 
2004:61; see also Berkowitz 2002b).   
 Jennifer Sims challenges the notion that traditional human intelligence is of little use 
against terrorist targets.  She writes: “the conventional wisdom that human intelligence against 
terrorist adversaries must operate principally outside traditional diplomatic circles is wrong.  
Classic modes of collection, including official cover, are crucial to detect and counter state 
sponsorship of terrorism and to work with foreign agencies engaged in domestic intelligence and 
law enforcement at the local level” (Sims 2007b:414).  She also argues that the most effective 
method of collection on terrorism is through a synergistic effort, using technical means as well as 
human sources (Sims 2005:55).  John Deutch and Jeffrey H. Smith (2002) make the similar point 
that cooperation between human and technical intelligence makes both stronger, as human 
sources can provide collectors with access they need to gather signals intelligence, while signals 
intercepts can help to validate information reported by human sources.   
 
Intelligence Performance Against Terrorism: Differing Schools of Thought   
 
Although there is general agreement in the scholarly and policy literature on many issues 
concerning intelligence and terrorism, consensus is lacking when it comes to more specific 
questions such as, who should bear the responsibility for failing to prevent the 9/11 attacks?  
And, how well has the U.S. intelligence community performed against terrorism?  Much of the 
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literature since 9/11 has attempted to answer these questions and to explain what the U.S. 
intelligence community (and to a lesser extent, the intelligence services of other nations) can or 
should do to prevent future attacks.  This literature can be divided into three schools of thought, 
each of which offers a quite different analysis of what has gone wrong in the past and what 
should be done in the future.  Although not all scholars and experts fit neatly into this typology, 
these three schools can be helpful in understanding the different approaches taken in the 
literature.     
 The most prominent school of thought concerning terrorism and intelligence might be 
termed the traditional school, which includes a number of well-known writers and thinkers 
about intelligence (see for example Pillar 2003; Heuer 2005; Betts 2006).  These thinkers believe 
the U.S. intelligence community has done a generally good job, even in the years and months 
leading up to 9/11, and they argue that if anyone is to blame for disasters such as 9/11, it is not 
intelligence officials, but the policymakers who failed to take heed of intelligence warnings.  In 
general, this school finds that failures such as 9/11 are largely unpreventable, and that while 
some improvements to intelligence are possible the best policy option is to assume that surprise 
attacks will succeed and prepare to deal with their effects.   
Other scholars and analysts take a less pessimistic view than the traditionalists, and argue 
that changes can be made to the intelligence community to improve significantly its ability to 
prevent terrorist attacks.  This school of thought, which might be called the intelligence 
reformist school, is expressed most prominently in the 9/11 Report (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004) and the work of scholars such as Amy Zegart 
(for example, Zegart 2007a, 2007c).  This view sees surprise as caused largely by preventable 
analytical and communications failures on the part of the intelligence community and policy 
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makers.  The likelihood of future failures can be reduced by intelligence reforms along lines that 
have been proposed for the past 50 years—which often stress organizational change—and by 
efforts to ensure that decision makers take heed of intelligence warnings.    
 A third school of analysts and scholars argues that terrorist attacks have succeeded 
because terrorism presents a dramatically new and different threat against which our intelligence 
and national security organizations have not been prepared.  Many of these writers focus on 
mistakes and failings of the Central Intelligence Agency, especially concerning human 
intelligence, so this school might be called the CIA critics’ school.  Recommendations from this 
view usually emphasize increased attention to HUMINT and covert operations.  (For example, 
Jenkins 2003, Gerecht 2004, Peter Berkowitz 2005, Baer 2005.)     
 
What Went Wrong on 9/11?   
 
This typology can help explain the differing views in the literature on one of the most enduring 
puzzles surrounding the 9/11 attacks: why the attacks had not been anticipated and prevented, 
even though American intelligence agencies and others had been warning for years about the 
threat from bin Laden and international terrorism.  James Wirtz puts the puzzle this way: “Even 
accounting for hindsight, it is difficult to understand how the government, the public, and the 
scholarly community all failed to respond to the threat posed by al Qaeda, in a way that is eerily 
similar to the failures that preceded Pearl Harbor” (Wirtz 2006:56).     
 There is of course no single, universally accepted explanation for what went wrong on 
9/11.  Some, especially from within the intelligence community, have argued that the attacks 
were not the result of an intelligence failure.  Then-Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet 
made this argument in 2002: “when people use the word ‘failure,’ ‘failure’ means no focus, no 
attention, no discipline—and those were not present in what either we or the FBI did here and 
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around the world” (Tenet 2002:136).  Some analysts and scholars take a macro view, arguing 
that blame for 9/11 must be assigned more widely than just to the intelligence community.  
Joshua Rovner, for example, writes, “September 11 was not an intelligence failure, it was a 
national failure” (Rovner 2005:3).  Others take a micro view, that the attacks were the result of 
individual incompetence or bad decisions (for example, Scheuer 2004; Clarke 2004).  
Nonetheless, the attacks on 9/11 have been widely seen as an intelligence failure unmatched by 
any in American history since Pearl Harbor, and each of the three schools of thought offers a 
different explanation for that failure.   
 The traditional school argues that prior to 9/11 the American intelligence community had 
done a generally good job, especially in terms of strategic intelligence—providing broad, long-
term warning of the rising threat from international terrorism and from al Qaeda in particular.  
But those warnings were not listened to, largely because they were drowned out by the noise 
from other intelligence and the press of other issues competing for the attention of policy makers.  
The collection of more precise intelligence might possibly have helped to prevent the attacks, but 
these thinkers point out that having more intelligence can just make the problem of analysis more 
difficult:  “the more dots there are, the more ways they can be connected—and which way is 
correct may become evident only when it is too late, when disaster clarifies which indicators 
were salient” (Betts 2007:105).   
 Traditional scholars acknowledge that officials (especially policy makers) made mistakes 
before 9/11, but they are more willing than thinkers in the other two schools of thought to forgive 
those mistakes as normal human error.  Richard Posner, for example, writes that intelligence 
failures such as 9/11 occur “not because our intelligence agencies are incompetent but because 
surprise attacks are extremely difficult to predict” (Posner 2007:23).     
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 The intelligence reformist school of thought, on the other hand, is more ready to blame 
the U.S. intelligence community for failures leading up to 9/11.  This argument, which is found 
in the 9/11 Report and has to a large extent driven the effort to reform the American intelligence 
community in recent years, holds that intelligence and national security officials lacked the 
imagination to “connect the dots” and make sense of the information that had been available.  
According to this view, American intelligence agencies prior to 9/11 had been too focused on the 
tactical level, and did not produce enough broad, long-range, strategic level intelligence 
assessments on the threat from bin Laden and al Qaeda.  Unlike traditional school thinkers who 
believe the U.S. IC did a good job in terms of strategic intelligence, the reformist school holds 
that if intelligence officials had done a better job of assembling the available warning signs into 
strategic assessments for senior policy makers, the attacks might have been prevented.  (See for 
example Steinberg, Graham, & Eggers 2003; Bazerman & Watkins 2004; Zegart 2007b.)   
 While the traditionalists believe the intelligence community has done a good job against 
an almost impossible task, the reformists argue that American intelligence agencies have done a 
much poorer job than they should have.  This view is expressed by the title of an op-ed by Amy 
Zegart in The Los Angeles Times: “American Intelligence—Still Stupid” (Zegart 2006d).  Zegart 
argues that years after 9/11 the intelligence community remains disorganized, lacks central 
direction, and duplicates much of its efforts.   
 The third school of thought argues the blame for 9/11 rests much more squarely with the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the most prominent American intelligence organization and the one 
with the bulk of the responsibility for human intelligence.  (See for example Codevilla 2004; 
Chambliss 2005.)  According to this view, prior to 9/11 the CIA and its Directorate of Operations 
(DO) that managed human intelligence failed to place enough emphasis on developing human 
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intelligence sources on al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.  Former CIA officer Gerecht 
(2004:1) describes the principal problem as “the failure of the CIA to develop a clandestine 
service with a methodology and officers capable of penetrating the Islamic holy-warrior 
organizations in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere.”  In the words of Robert Baer, also a 
former CIA officer (2005:66), “Not to be too blunt about it, but if the DO had a source close to 
Osama bin Laden, 9/11 would not have happened.”   
 
Why Has Intelligence Failed?   
 
According to the traditional school of thought, the primary problem has been a failure of both the 
intelligence community and policy makers to understand and make proper use of the intelligence 
information that was available.  As Richards Heuer puts it, “More major intelligence failures 
have been caused by failures of analysis than by failures of intelligence collection” (Heuer 
2005:84).  Intelligence analysis was faulty, according to this view, largely because it put too 
much emphasis on developing tactical level intelligence, which analysts and officials fail to 
realize will rarely be available.  Ephraim Kam, for example, writes that prior to 9/11 
“Intelligence was more oriented toward tactical analysis in support of operations than on the 
strategic analysis needed to develop a broader understanding of Al Qaeda and the threat it posed” 
(Kam 2004:xviii-xix).   
 Intelligence reformists tend to agree with the traditional school that intelligence warnings 
are usually available prior to major failures.  But they believe the major problem is that 
intelligence is not sufficiently shared and coordinated within the vast intelligence community and 
government bureaucracy.  The 9/11 Commission, for example, famously argued that the U.S. 
intelligence community failed to “connect the dots” of the available intelligence that was held by 
various government agencies and in different databases (9/11 Report:408).   
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 The CIA critics’ school, on the other hand, argues there was not enough intelligence to 
have anticipated and prevented the attacks.  The failure was not primarily one of analysis, or of 
an inability to share information that was already in the system.  The failure of 9/11 was a failure 
of intelligence collection.  In the words of the Economist (2003), “There were too few useful 
dots.”   The critical problem leading to a lack of intelligence collection on the threat was the 
failure of the U.S. intelligence community—and particularly the CIA—to place enough emphasis 
on developing human intelligence sources on al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.  Reuel Marc 
Gerecht expresses this view in arguing that the example of John Walker Lindh demonstrates that 
it was possible for Americans to penetrate al Qaeda.  Before 9/11 the CIA never tried to develop 
their own John Walker Lindh, “yet even one such source could have obviated any need for 
Washington to ‘connect the dots’” (Gerecht 2004).    
 
What is the Root Cause of the Problem for Intelligence?   
 
Although the traditional school believes the immediate cause of failure is analytical, for 
these thinkers the more fundamental cause lies in the limits of human cognition and 
psychological factors such as an over-reliance on pre-conceived assumptions.  This emphasis on 
cognitive and psychological factors helps explain why this school of thought tends to see 
intelligence failure as largely unavoidable.  Just as human nature and patterns of cognition are 
resistant to change, psychological limitations on intelligence are resistant to improvement.  Betts, 
for example, notes in his classic statement of the traditional approach to intelligence failure that 
“Unlike organizational structure . . . cognition cannot be altered by legislation” (Betts 1978:83).   
For reformist thinkers, the fundamental problem underlying the inability of the 
intelligence community to share and process information properly lies at the level of structure 
and organization.  Amy Zegart, for example, has argued that the CIA and FBI missed 23 
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potential opportunities to disrupt the 9/11 attacks, largely because organizational routines and 
cultures were resistant to change and intelligence and national security organizations were 
unwilling to adapt to the development of new threats.  “While individuals made mistakes, 
organizational deficiencies were the root cause of 11 September” (Zegart 2007b:43).   
For thinkers in the CIA critics’ school, the fundamental problem is that terrorism is a new 
and dramatically more difficult threat than intelligence and national security agencies have had 
to deal with in the past.  This is partly because terrorist groups have “smaller signatures” than the 
nation-state enemies of the past, and also because terrorists practice deception.  Many in this 
group argue that America and the world are facing a new type of warfare; Bruce Berkowitz, for 
example, writes that the 9/11 attacks were “an act of military genius—and may well foreshadow 
the next era of warfare” (Berkowitz 2002a:291-292; see also Shultz & Vogt 2003).  
 
What Should be Done?   
 
Most observers of the American intelligence community agree that some sort of change is 
needed if intelligence agencies are to cope satisfactorily with the threat of terrorism.  But much 
of the advice offered may be difficult to put in practice, such as the call for the intelligence 
community to “become as agile and as innovative as its terrorist adversary” (Harris 2002:13).     
 The three schools of thought offer strikingly different prescriptions for the future of 
intelligence.  Scholars in the traditional camp tend to be the most cautious about calls for major 
reform, and argue that dramatic change is neither needed nor helpful.  Paul Pillar, for example, 
argues that the U.S. intelligence community has been working hard on the problem of 
international terrorism since at least 1986, when the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center was 
established.  Since 9/11 the number of analysts working on terrorism has increased, but he 
believes that change is less significant than it looks—and in fact may be reducing the quality of 
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intelligence available.  “A surge in the number of analysts assigned to counterterrorist 
components meant analysts were almost stumbling over each other in turning out large numbers 
of papers, only a tiny proportion of which could be expected to be of real use in heading off the 
next major attack” (Pillar 2007:156).  The best way to improve the IC’s “batting average” against 
terrorist attacks, according to this view, is to improve the quality of intelligence analysis, first by 
improving the selection and training of analysts, and second by doing a better job of long-term, 
strategic-level analysis (Betts 2002).   
Traditional scholars tend to believe that the challenges facing intelligence today in the 
struggle against terrorism are similar in many ways to the challenges faced in the past.  In the 
words of Richard Betts: “The difference between the world of 2006 and that of 1999 is no more 
radical than the difference between the worlds of 1999 and 1992” (Betts 2006:46; see also Betts 
2007).  This view is a pessimistic one.  Traditionalists note that despite the best efforts by the 
military, intelligence, and academic communities during the Cold War, the problem of 
preventing surprise attacks even in the face of warning was never believed to be solved.  Because 
the reasons for failure today are largely the same as in the past, there seems little reason to 
believe that the current generation of intelligence officials will be more successful in avoiding 
surprise than their predecessors were at avoiding surprise attacks such as Pearl Harbor.   
Other observers—many of whom can be associated with the intelligence reformist 
school—believe that dramatic change is needed in the structure, operations, and culture of 
intelligence agencies.  Reformist thinkers tend to be more optimistic than traditionalists about the 
prospect for significant improvement in intelligence capabilities against terrorism, possibly 
because the organizational problems they see at work appear to them to be more correctable than 
the traditionalists see psychological and cognitive problems to be.  Some reformists focus on 
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improving the systems, networks, and procedures used to process and analyze information within 
the intelligence community (Kamarck 2005).  But the most common call—most notably by the 
9/11 Commission—has been for greater centralization of the American intelligence community, 
leading to the creation of what has become the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.   
 Other reformists believe that the IC needs to be less centralized, adopting structures more 
akin to networks, with flatter hierarchies.  Jenifer Sims and others argue that the push for greater 
centralization is misguided, because the future of conflict and warfare is leading toward network 
structures and decentralized enemies, and it takes a network to fight a network (Sims 2005; see 
also Arquilla 2002, Barger 2005, Cronin 2005, Atran 2006).   
Thinkers in the reformist school do not argue the necessary changes will be as easy as 
simply changing the line-and-block organizational diagrams of the IC and individual intelligence 
agencies.  Effective change will require, according to this view, reforming the basic culture of 
intelligence organizations (Barger 2005).  And it may require an even more dramatic and 
fundamental change than that.  According to Alfred Rolington (2006:741), “what is required is 
rather more than tinkering but, instead, a fundamental reassessment of long-standing 
assumptions about intelligence as a whole.”  Some thinkers argue that the new threats since 9/11, 
combined with changes in information technology and in the nature of warfare, require nothing 
less than a “Revolution in Intelligence Affairs” (Barger 2005; see also Lahneman 2007).     
Thinkers in the CIA critics’ school often advocate greater use of covert operations and 
preemptive military force against terrorist targets, but the major recommendation from this 
school is for increased emphasis on human intelligence.  The Economist, for example, argues 
(2003) that the focus on improving analysis found in much of the discussion about intelligence 
reform “distracts attention from the real need: improved espionage, to provide the essential 
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missing intelligence.”  The best way to do it, the magazine’s editors argued, is to place spies 
within the “innermost councils” of terrorist organizations.  But writers in this school are often 
gloomy about the prospect for change in American intelligence, largely because they do not 
believe the CIA will be able or willing to make the changes needed.  Gerecht (2006:3), for 
example, writes: “Regrettably, reform at the CIA is now dead.”      
Table 1 Intelligence and Terrorism Schools of Thought   
 
 Traditional Reformist  CIA critics  
 
Prominent examples  
 
 




Lahneman   
Peter Berkowitz, 





there, but was 
drowned out (signals 
v. noise)  
Information was 
there, but was not 
shared (failure to 
connect the dots)  
Information was not 
there, because of lack 
of human intelligence  
Primary responsibility 
for 9/11 and other 
failures  





especially CIA)   
Performance of the 
U.S. intelligence 
community  
Good on strategic 
intelligence; 
understandably poor 
on tactical warning  
Very poor; lack of 
imagination, failure to 
share information  
Very poor, especially 
by CIA in conducting 




Analytical failure  Failure to share 
available information 
within the intelligence 
community  
Collection failure  










is a new and more 
difficult enemy  







but possible  
Gloomy—the CIA is 
unlikely to improve 
significantly  
What should be done? 
 
 
Better selection and 
training of analysts; 
prepare to absorb and 
respond to failure; 
greater focus on 






Greater focus on 
human intelligence, 
counterintelligence, 






Additional Topics Discussed, and Gaps in the Literature   
Although the topics reviewed above are some of the most commonly discussed issues in the 
literature on intelligence and terrorism, a number of authors have focused on more specific 
questions.  Some have examined the use of intelligence in countering particular types of terrorist 
threats, such as nuclear (Zenko 2006), biological (Enemark 2006), chemical (Pita 2007), or cyber 
terrorism (Gosler 2005).  The American intelligence community’s poor performance in assessing 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs suggests to some that the IC may not be up to the 
task of countering WMD-armed terrorist adversaries (see for example Russell 2005).   
 Recommendations for intelligence agencies in the effort against terrorism include greater 
focus on tracking terrorist finances (Rudner 2005, Williams 2005, Winston 2007), increased 
monitoring of terrorist-related Internet sites (Renfer & Haas 2008), and more emphasis on the 
broader themes and messages of propaganda from groups such as al Qaeda (Jordan, Terres, & 
Horsburgh 2004).   
 While most of the literature on intelligence and terrorism since 9/11 has focused on the 
threat from al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups, some authors look at other terrorist 
problems.  Examples include the British use of intelligence in Northern Ireland (Bamford 2005), 
Greek intelligence success in dismantling the 17 November group (Nomikos 2007), and the 
lessons to be learned from the Israeli intelligence community’s experience with terrorism 
(Pedahzur & Perliger 2007).       
 Scholars studying the intersection of intelligence and terrorism are quite aware of the 
importance of producing policy-relevant work; as Arthur Hulnick writes (2005:593), “Nothing is 
more important in the world of intelligence than preventing surprise.”  But in general the 
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literature on intelligence and terrorism is more useful for understanding the limitations of 
intelligence in preventing terrorist attacks than in proposing ways to improve that performance.  
A few writers, including Hulnick, Khalsa (2004), and Sinai (2007), have examined the question 
of developing indications and warning (I&W) systems for forecasting terrorist attacks, and more 
work here could potentially be of great value.   
 Another area where additional research is needed is in the study of intelligence success 
against terrorism.  Marrin has called for such work, but notes that research on intelligence 
success is likely to be difficult, because the information needed is probably classified: “while 
such a study of successes might be promising, it would also be very difficult to accomplish from 
outside the intelligence community” (Marrin 2004:661).  Among the few works that do discuss 
intelligence successes are Betts (2002, 2007) and Irons (2008).     
Much of this literature focuses on the analysis and collection of information and on how 
it is disseminated to decision makers and other customers.  Although a number of authors note 
that other intelligence disciplines such as covert action and counterintelligence are critical in the 
struggle against terrorism, relatively little work has been done focusing on those topics.  
Exceptions include Le Gallo (2005) on covert action, and Wannell (2002), Danis (2007), and 
Shultz and Beitler (2004) on counterintelligence.   
More broadly, there has been little work attempting to carefully examine the question of 
whether terrorism presents a truly new problem for intelligence, or whether it simply echoes the 
challenges seen by earlier generations of analysts and collectors.  A number of scholars and 
analysts have noted similarities between the two most notable examples of such attacks against 
America, Pearl Harbor and 9/11; useful examples include Wirtz (2002) and Borch (2002).  But 
more research is needed into the broader theoretical similarities and differences between the 
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problem of surprise attack from terrorism today, and the challenges posed for intelligence by 
conventional attack or by other types of surprises.  (A notable exception to this gap is Marrin 
2004.)      
 Relatively few detailed case studies have been produced of how intelligence performed in 
the face of terrorist attacks other than 9/11, likely because information is difficult to obtain.  
Exceptions include Segell (2004) on the Madrid train bombings and Dahl (2005) on the 1983 
Marine Barracks bombing in Lebanon.  Most studies of the American intelligence community 
focus on the CIA and (to a lesser degree) the FBI.  Considerably less work has been done on the 
many other agencies that make up U.S. intelligence.  An exception is Jones (2006) on the 
intelligence arm of the Department of Homeland Security.  And authors who discuss 
interrogation usually focus on the important questions of what is torture and how to balance 
human rights with national security.  With the exception of the ground-breaking study by the 
Intelligence Science Board (2006) and a few others (Strategic Survey 2004, Van de Velde 2005), 
little work is available on the potential intelligence value from prisoner interrogations.   
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Online resources   
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, at http://www.dni.gov/, was established after 
the 9/11 attacks in order to impose greater centralization on the vast U.S. intelligence 
community.  Its web site provides information on American intelligence organization and policy, 
and also offers links to the other agencies that make up the intelligence community.   
The National Counterterrorism Center, at http://www.nctc.gov/, was established in 2004 as the 
primary U.S. government organization for analyzing terrorism-related intelligence, and for 
planning and coordinating counter-terrorism activities across the entire government.   
The website of the 9/11 Commission, at http://www.9-11commission.gov/, is 
now managed by the National Archives and Records Administration.  In addition to the 9/11 
Report itself, this site includes links to the many other products of the 9/11 Commission’s work, 
including staff statements, monographs, and public hearings.    
The web site of the Federation of American Scientists, at http://www.fas.org/irp/index.html, is a 
useful resource for government documents and reports of all kinds on intelligence and other 
security and defense matters.  
The Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, is a 
useful source of reports and studies, including links to translated (and original) al Qaeda 
documents captured in Iraq.  Its web site is at http://ctc.usma.edu/default.asp.   
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